Expansion of Arbitral Immunity: Is Absolute Immunity a Foregone Conclusion, The by Brown, Jenny
Journal of Dispute Resolution 
Volume 2009 Issue 1 Article 10 
2009 
Expansion of Arbitral Immunity: Is Absolute Immunity a Foregone 
Conclusion, The 
Jenny Brown 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/jdr 
 Part of the Dispute Resolution and Arbitration Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Jenny Brown, Expansion of Arbitral Immunity: Is Absolute Immunity a Foregone Conclusion, The, 2009 J. 
Disp. Resol. (2009) 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/jdr/vol2009/iss1/10 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at University of Missouri School of Law 
Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of Dispute Resolution by an authorized editor 
of University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact 
bassettcw@missouri.edu. 
The Expansion of Arbitral Immunity:




With the increased use of arbitration in recent years, the concept of judicial
immunity has expanded its scope to include arbitrators. As a result, states are
currently enacting their own legislation regarding arbitrator immunity and are
looking for guidance in how to do so. In response, the National Conference of
Commissioners on State Laws has drafted two model acts, referred to as the Uni-
form Arbitration Act and the Revised Uniform Arbitration Act for states to utilize
in formulating their own arbitration laws.2 Currently the Uniform Arbitration Act
has been adopted in thirteen states and is being considered in four other states.3
Additionally, the New Jersey Arbitration Act ("the Act"), the legislation at issue
here, was adopted from the Uniform Arbitration Act.4 While portions of the Act
have already come under judicial review, Malik v. Ruttenberg presented state
courts with the first opportunity to interpret the Act's immunity provision. 5 In
Malik, the Appellate Division of the New Jersey Superior Court upheld the exten-
sion of absolute immunity to arbitrators without considering the adoption of quali-
fied immunity.6 Regrettably, that decision may have negative repercussions for
the field of arbitration. By reinforcing the status quo, the court essentially gave its
support and approval to policies that have eroded accountability and integrity in
the arbitration process. Furthermore, because state courts may now look to Malik
for guidance in interpreting cases, it will be more difficult to implement a new
standard of qualified immunity for arbitrators in the future.
1. Malik v. Ruttenberg, 942 A.2d 136 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2008).
2. See Charles Toutant, Arbitrator Is Not Liable for Attorney's Alleged Assault of Party, Court
Says, N.J. L.J. (Mar. 2008), available at http://www.law.conjsp/article.jsp?id=1204544935082 (last
visited Apr. 14, 2009).
3. Id. States that have adopted the Uniform Arbitration Act include Alaska, Colorado, District of
Columbia, Hawaii, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma,
Oregan, Utah, and Washington. See Uniform Law Commissioners, Section on Uniform Arbitration
Act, Legislative Fact Sheet, available at




6. Malik, 942 A.2d at 141-42.
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11. FACTS AND HOLDING
In 2003, Plaintiff Ric Malik entered into a home renovation contract in Moo-
restown. During the renovation process, a "serious dispute" arose between Malik
and the homeowners. 8 The contract between the parties stated that disputes would
be submitted to arbitration pursuant to the rules established by the American Arbi-
tration Association ("AAA"). 9 As such, the dispute was submitted to arbitration
proceedings, and Peter Liloia, III was appointed as the arbitrator.'
0
During the arbitration proceeding on Nov. 17, 2005, Malik's attorney ob-
jected to the conduct of one of the homeowner's attorneys." In his objection,
Malik's attorney urged Liloia to remove the homeowner's attorney from the pro-
ceedings.' 2  Liloia denied the removal request and thereafter called a brief re-
cess. 13 During this recess, the homeowner's attorney allegedly assaulted Malik in
the lobby.' 4 Because the altercation did not occur in the room where the arbitra-
tion proceedings were taking place, Liloia did not personally observe it. In re-
sponse to this alleged assault, Malik filed a complaint asserting that defendants
AAA and Liloia knew of the "dangerous propensities of the homeowner's attor-
ney but failed to exercise reasonable care to control these tendencies."' 5 In his
complaint, Malik characterized Liloia's failure to control the homeowner's attor-
ney as an "abdication of his judicial or quasi-judicial authority.' 6 Following the
court's denial of defendants' initial motion to dismiss, Liloia and AAA filed an
answer to Malik's complaint. 17 In the answer, defendants asserted that New Jer-
sey Statute Section 2A:23B-14 immunized them from liability.' 8 On June 5, 2007,
defendants renewed their motion to dismiss with the superior court, but dismissal
was denied.19 Thereafter, the defendants appealed.20 On appeal, the New Jersey
Superior Court held that arbitrators and arbitration associations are judicially im-








15. Id. The complaint was filed with the Superior Court, Law Division, Camden County.
16. Id. at 141.
17. Id. at 138.
18. Id. This statute states that:
a. An arbitrator or an arbitration organization acting in that capacity is immune from civil liabili-
ty to the same extent as a judge of a court of this State acting in a judicial capacity.
b. The immunity afforded by this section supplements any immunity pursuant to other law.
c. The failure of an arbitrator to make a disclosure required by section 12 of this act does not
cause any loss of immunity pursuant to this section.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:23B-14 (2003).
19. Malik, 942 A.2d at 138. The motion judge referred to the affidavit of merit filed by plaintiffs,
which stated that defendants had a duty to control the proceedings and failure to do so "falls outside of
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A. Laying the Foundation: The Doctrine of Judicial Immunity
Dating back to medieval times, the doctrine of judicial immunity, which af-
fords protection to federal and state judges acting in their judicial capacity, has
served an essential function in the judicial system.22 Derived from English com-
mon law, the fundamental doctrine of judicial immunity emerged alongside the
development of the appellate system. 23 As the appellate system evolved, appellate
procedures became the standard for correcting judicial error.24
In the United States, courts have long recognized the importance of the doc-
trine of judicial immunity. In Stump v. Sparkman, the United States Supreme
Court recognized the doctrine as a "general principle of the highest importance to
the proper administration of justice that a judicial officer, in exercising the author-
ity vested in him, [should] be free to act upon his own convictions, without appre-
hension of personal consequences to himself., 25 In Forrester v. White, the Court
revisited the question of judicial immunity and again affirmed the doctrine by
noting the numerous policy considerations in its support. 26 These considerations
include protecting the finality of judgments, discouraging inappropriate collateral
attacks, and protecting the judicial independence of judges from "vexatious ac-
tions prosecuted by disgruntled litigants. 27
Beyond these general policy considerations, courts have also stressed the ab-
solute nature of judicial immunity.28 In supporting such a sweeping form of im-
munity, courts have greeted challenges to absolute immunity with hostility.29 For
example, in Mireles v. Waco, the Supreme Court reversed a judgment from the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals and stressed that "judicial immunity is an immuni-
ty from suit, not just from ultimate assessment of damages., 30 Additionally, the
Court asserted that immunity is "not overcome by allegations of bad faith or ma-
lice."31 In fact, the Court found that "immunity applies even when the judge is
21. Id. at 142.
22. Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 225-26 (1988).
23. Id. at 225.
24. See generally Maureen A. Weston, Reexamining Arbitral Immunity in an Age of Mandatory and
Professional Arbitration, 88 MINN. L. REv. 449,476 (2004).
25. 435 U.S. 349, 355 (1978).
26. Id. at 225 (citing Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. 335, 348 (1872)).
27. Forrester, 484 U.S. at 225 (citing Bradley, 80 U.S. at 347).
28. Id. at 226. The Court emphasized, "Freeing the judicial process of harassment or intimidation []
has been thought to require absolute immunity." Id.
29. Id. at 225-26.
30. 502 U.S. 9, 11 (1991). In Mireles v. Waco, the Court granted a motion to dismiss the claim
against a judge who had instructed police officers to forcibly and with excessive force seize and bring
the plaintiff to the courtroom. Id. at 12. There, the Court found that the judge was acting within his
judicial capacity when he ordered the police officer to use even excessive force. Id. at 13. Thus, the
judge's actions were protected under the cloak of judicial immunity. Id.
31. Id. at 11 (discussing Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967)).
No. 1]
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accused of acting maliciously and corruptly. ' 32 Courts have also held that judicial
immunity is applicable to judicial acts that are wrong or beyond the judge's au-
thority.33 For instance, in Stump v. Sparkman, the Supreme Court concluded that
"a judge is absolutely immune for liability from his judicial acts even if his exer-
cise of authority is flawed by the commission of grave procedural errors." 
4
B. Extensions and Limitations on the Doctrine
After the Court's early decisions cemented the doctrine's place in the judicial
process, judicial immunity eventually expanded to several other official entities.35
This extension was largely due to the Court's reasoning that absolute immunity is
"justified and defined by the functions it protects and serves, not by the person to
whom it attaches."36 In Butz v. Economou, the Court granted judicial immunity to
Executive Branch officials who perform quasi-judicial functions.3 7 Similarly,
Imbler v. Pachtman extended immunity to officials who performed prosecutorial
functions that are "intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal
process.' '38 In Briscoe v. LaHue, immunity was even extended to advocates and
witnesses, further underscoring the deference given to the doctrine.
3 9
Clearly, courts have treated the doctrine of judicial immunity with high re-
gard; however, the doctrine is not limitless.4° Courts have traditionally held that
judicial immunity is not applicable in two specific circumstances. First, immunity
is not extended to judges acting in a non-judicial capacity-in other words, courts
have made a distinction between judicial and administrative acts.41 Second, ac-
tions taken in the complete absence of jurisdiction (i.e., outside of the scope of the
arbitrator's role) are not immune.42 The question of whether arbitrators act in a
purely judicial capacity, and thus whether a similar type of absolute immunity
should be extended to those individuals, is considered below.
C. Arbitrator Immunity: Absolute or Qualified?
With the increased acceptance of alternative dispute resolution procedures in
recent years, arbitration has gained support among the federal government and the
32. Pierson, 386 U.S. at 554.
33. K.D. v. Bozarth, 713 A.2d 546, 549 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div 1998).
34. Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978). Similarly, in Bradley v. Fischer, the Court applied the
judicial immunity doctrine to a trial court judge's decision to disbar an attorney for personal insults
because the power to disbar was within the court's jurisdiction. 80 U.S. 335. 347-50 (1871). Later, the
Supreme Court discussed Bradley and reiterated," a judge will not be deprived of immunity because
the action he took was in error, done maliciously, or was in excess of his authority; rather, he will be
subject to liability only when he has acted in the clear absence of all jurisdiction." Sparkman, 435 U.S.
at 356-357 (citing Bradley, 80 U.S. at 348).
35. Austem v. Chi. Bd. Options Exch., Inc., 898 F.2d 882, 885 (2d Cir. 1990). See, e.g., Yaselli v.
Goff, 12 F.2d 396,406 (2d Cir. 1926); Barr v. Abrams, 810 F.2d 358, 361 (2d Cir. 1987).
36. Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 227 (1988).
37. 438 U.S. 478, 512-514 (1978).
38. 424 U.S. 409, 430 (1976).
39. 460 U.S. 325, 335 (1983).
40. Weston, supra note 24, at 449,475-95.
41. Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11 (1991).
42. Id. at 12.
(Vol. 2009
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courts. The Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA") serves as a congressional declara-
tion of a liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements, notwithstanding
any state substantive or procedural policies to the contrary.4 3 Since the FAA's
passage, the National Conference of Commissioners on State Laws has proffered
model codes (referred to as the Uniform Arbitration Act and Revised Uniform
Arbitration Act) which states have followed in enacting their own arbitration
guidelines. 44 With the onset of this alternate dispute resolution forum, the concept
of applying judicial immunity to arbitrators has also gained support.45
To better understand why arbitral immunity has found such support in the
United States, it is helpful to briefly discuss various justifications for the doctrine.
Throughout history, several jurisprudential theories have influenced how arbitral
immunity is viewed in different jurisdictions.
The contractual theory originated in the nineteenth century and is followed by
some civil law European countries.46 The contractual theory focuses on the arbi-
tration agreement itself-meaning that "it is the agreement to arbitrate that alone
gives the arbitrators the authority to make the award." The arbitrators then serve
only as the agents of the parties in resolving the dispute.47 In countries that follow
the contractual theory, arbitrators and judges are not viewed as equivalents.4 8
Rather, arbitrators are viewed as professionals and therefore subject to civil liabili-
ty like all other professionals. 49 Judges, on the other hand, are accountable to the
State alone and, as such, are immune from any sort of civil liability.
50
In contrast, the jurisdictional theory stands for the proposition that the roles
judges and arbitrators play are analogous. 51 This theory has shaped attitudes to-
ward arbitration in the United States and finds support in other jurisdictions that
subscribe to absolute arbitral immunity.52 This theory is justified largely on the
grounds that it encourages the use of arbitration as an alternative dispute resolu-
tion forum.
53
The last relevant theory, and the theory which supports qualified immunity, is
the hybrid theory. 54 Supporters of this theory "believe that the reality lies some-
where in the middle of the contractual and jurisdictional theory, namely, that nei-
ther the arbitrator performs a legal function nor that the award is a contract ... The
43. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10 (1984). See also 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2000) (stating that
arbitration agreements "shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable").
44. See Toutant, supra note 2. See also, EDWARD J. BRUNET ET AL., ARBITRATION LAW IN
AMERICA: A CRITICAL ASSESsMENT, 56 (Cambridge U. Press 2006).
45. See, Feichtinger v. Conant, 893 P.2d 1266, 1267 (Alaska 1995); Calzarano v. Liebowitz, 550 F.
Supp 1389, 1391 (S.D.N.Y. 1982); Austem v. Chi. Bd. Options Exch., Inc., 898 F.2d 882, 885-87 (2d
Cir. 1990); Corey v. N.Y. Stock Exch., 691 F.2d 1205, 1209-10 (6th Cir 1982); Blue Cross Blue Shield
of Tex. v. Juneau, 114 S.W.3d 126, 130-34 (Tex. App. 2003).
46. Anastasia Tsakatoura, Arbitration: The Immunity of Arbitrators, LEx E-SCRIPTA ONLINE LEGAL
J. (June 20, 2002), available at http://www.inter-lawyer.com/lex-e-scripta/articles/arbitrators-
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arbitrator's duty is to judge but the power to do so is conferred to him by the
agreement of the parties.
Because the United States has embraced the jurisdictional theory, the judicial
immunity doctrine's scope has further expanded. 6 Arbitrators are now considered
the "functional equivalent" of judges when acting within their quasi-judicial du-
ties, and therefore, courts have found that the judicial immunity doctrine should
apply to arbitrators. 57 In reaching this conclusion, courts have largely relied upon
the rationales of former decisions regarding judicial immunity. 5 8 Such reasoning
stresses that "arbitral immunity is essential to protect decision-makers from undue
influence and [to] protect the decision-making process from reprisals by dissatis-
fied litigants."
59
In addition, most federal Courts of Appeals have recognized the doctrine,
holding that judicial and quasi judicial immunity extends to both arbitrators and
organizations that sponsor arbitrations (e.g., the American Arbitration Associa-
tion). 6  Thus, like courts of law, sponsors are immune from liability for actions
taken in connection with administering arbitrations. 61 As the Sixth Circuit con-
cluded:
The functional comparability of the arbitrators' decision-making process
and judgments to those of judges and agency hearing examiners gene-
rates the same need for independent judgment, free from the threat of
lawsuits. [Arbitral] immunity furthers this need ... [and] is essential to
protect the decision maker ....
Therefore, extending the doctrine beyond arbitrators to also include sponsors
is "a natural and necessary product of the policies underlying arbitral immunity."
63
The Second, Sixth, and Eighth Circuits all agree that arbitrators' immunity would
be illusory without this extension.
6 4
Furthermore, in Butz v. Economou, the Supreme Court implied that it might
approve of absolute arbitral immunity; though the Court did not define the specific
acts that would fall under the doctrine of judicial immunity, it held that there are
certain persons "whose special functions require a full exemption from liability.,
65
Still, recent federal Courts of Appeals decisions, such as Pfannenstiel v. Merrill
Lynch and Caudle v. American Arbitration Ass'n, take a narrower approach to the
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Pfannenstiel v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 477 F.3d 1155, 1158-59 (10th Cir. 2007)
("Every... circuit that has considered the issue of arbitral immunity recognizes the doctrine").
58. Id.
59. New England Cleaning Servs. v. Am. Arbitration Ass'n, 199 F.3d 542, 545 (1st Cir. 1999).
60. Austem v. Chi. Bd. Options Exch., Inc., 898 F.2d 882, 886 (2d Cir, 1990)
61. Pfannenstiel, 477 F.3d at 1158 (listing high courts that had considered and recognized the doc-
trine as of 2007).
62. 898 F.2d 882, 886 (2d Cir. 1990) (quoting Corey v. N.Y. Stock Exch., Inc., 691 F.2d 1205, 1211
(6th Cir. 1982)).
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doctrine. 66 These decisions opine that the doctrine of arbitral immunity does not
necessarily protect arbitrators or organizations absolutely.67 Rather, for immunity
to apply, the claim at issue must arise out of a decisional act and not one that is
merely administrative. 68 Whether more courts will follow the this approach is yet
to be seen, but in any event, the doctrine of absolute immunity continues to enjoy
broad application in the United States.
Given the longstanding tradition of judicial immunity, it is not surprising that
immunity has gradually extended to arbitrators acting in a judicial capacity. Un-
der the current scheme, courts have restricted their analysis to two choices-that
of complete immunity or complete liability. Largely left out of the discussion is
the option of qualified immunity-a hybrid that pulls from both the contractual
and judicial theories. Qualified immunity protects parties from the arbitrator's
acts of bad faith (e.g., gross negligence and fraud), while still extending immunity
where such conditions were not present. Even England, which has fairly broad
immunity for arbitrators, does not allow immunity in all circumstances. 69 Rather,
arbitrators are held liable for acts of bad faith.70 Despite the United States' tradi-
tion of complete arbitral immunity, the question of how far this immunity should
extend is still up for debate as states enact their own laws governing arbitration.
The New Jersey Superior Court recently had an opportunity to define the proper
role of arbitral immunity in Malik v. Ruttenberg.71
IV. INSTANT DECISION
In Malik, the court considered the scope of an arbitrator's immunity from civ-
il liability as a matter of law. 72 To begin, the court cited several provisions of the
New Jersey Arbitration Act ("the Act") supporting the proposition that New Jer-
sey law had long embraced arbitration as a "speedy and efficient approach to dis-
pute resolution. 73 Applying the facts of the case to the Act's definitions, the
court concluded that Liloia and AAA qualified as an arbitrator and an arbitration
association, respectively.74 Having reached this conclusion, the discussion then
turned toward the issue of immunity.75 Given that the Act's arbitration immunity
66. Pfannenstiel, 477 F.3d at 1159; Caudle v. Am. Arbitration Ass'n, 230 F.3d 920, 922 (7th Cir.
2000) (suggesting that arbitration association would not be immune from a claim for a refund due to its
failure to provide promised arbitration services).
67. Pfannenstiel, 477 F.3d at 1159.
68. Id.
69. See Tsakatoura, supra note 46.
70. Id.
71. 942 A.2d 136 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2008).
72. Id. at 139.
73. Id. (citing various sections of the New Jersey Arbitration Act). "Arbitrator" is defined in the Act
as: "'Arbitrator' means an individual appointed either as a neutral arbitrator or as a party arbitrator to
render an award, alone or with others, in a controversy that is subject to an agreement to arbitrate."
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:23B-1. "Arbitration organization" is defined by the Act as: "'Arbitration organi-
zation' means an association, agency, board, commission or other entity that is neutral and initiates,
sponsors or administers an arbitration proceeding or is involved in the appointment of an arbitrator."
Id.
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provision "supplements any immunity pursuant to other law," the court's immuni-
ty analysis involved an examination of both state and federal law.
76
The court began its examination of the common law by retracing the histori-
cal origins of judicial immunity. 77 Here, the court cited numerous cases in support
of the doctrine's rationale that "the independent and impartial exercise of judg-
ment vital to the judiciary might be impaired by exposure to potential damages
liability.""8 Finding the doctrine of judicial immunity well established as an abso-
lute immunity at common law, the court went on to discuss the doctrine's exten-
sion to the work of quasi-judicial figures like arbitrators.79
The court stressed that immunity for judicial or quasi-judicial officials is not
unlimited.80 Citing previous cases, the court asserted that immunity only includes
"judicial acts performed within the individual's subject matter jurisdiction."8'
Further, the court noted that the Supreme Court has "never undertaken to articu-
late a precise and general definition of the class of acts entitled to immunity."8 2 In
its reasoning, the court relied on the Supreme Court's view that "[w]hether the act
done by [a judge] was judicial or not is to be determined by its character, and not
by the character of the agent." 83 To make this determination, it is important to
look toward the nature of the act and the expectations of the parties to decide
"whether it is a function normally performed by a judge... [and] whether [the par-
ties] dealt with the judge in his judicial capacity." 84
In this case, the court found unpersuasive the plaintiff's assertion that the
failure of Liloia (the arbitrator) to exercise control over the homeowner's attorney
violated his judicial or quasi-judicial authority.8 5 In reaching this conclusion, the
court noted that the New Jersey Court Rules provide judges considerable authority
to conduct proceedings.86 This authority allows judges wide discretion in manag-
ing the judicial process, including imposing sanctions on an attorney or expelling
a spectator; the court found this same authority applicable to arbitration proceed-
ings.87 The court also noted that the common law has recognized immunity from
civil liability in civil proceedings, and other circuits considering the issue have
uniformly upheld the validity of arbitral immunity for both arbitrators and arbitra-• • 88
tor organizations. Thus, it was clear to the court "that an arbitration association,like AAA, 'enjoys arbitral immunity from civil liability for the acts of its arbitra-
76. ld. (citing N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:23B-14b (West Supp. 2008)).
77. Id. at 139-40.
78. Id. at 140 (quoting Antoine v. Byers & Anderson, Inc., 508 U.S. 429, 435 (1993)).
79. Id. at 140.
80L Id. at 140-41.
81. Id.
82. Id. (quoting Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 227 (1998)).
83. Id. (quoting Forrester, 484 U.S. at 228).
84. Id. (quoting Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 362 (1978)).
85. Id. at 141.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 141-42 (quoting Pfannenstiel v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 477 F.3d 1155,
1158-59 (10th Cir. 2007), for the proposition that "[e]very other circuit that has considered the issue of
arbitral immunity [had] recognize[d] the doctrine").
[Vol. 2009
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tors in the course of conducting contractually agreed-upon arbitration proceed-
ings. ,
, 89
In applying this theoretical basis to the facts of the case, the court found that
the act of calling a recess and denying an application to remove an attorney from
an arbitration proceeding falls directly within the adjudicative functions of the
arbitrator. 90 Ruling that arbitral immunity aplied to the cause of action, the court
had no choice but to dismiss the complaint. 1 Importantly, the court also noted
that it was of no importance that the arbitrator might have exercised his authority
differently.92 Rather, it only mattered that the action was one of a judicial rather
than administrative nature and thus fell under the doctrine of arbitral immunity.
93
As such, the court reversed the July 18, 2007, order that denied AAA's and Li-
loia's motion to dismiss the complaint. 94
V. COMMENT
Throughout the years, the extension of judicial immunity to arbitrators has
been justified on a variety of grounds. However, with the onset of modem arbitra-
tion, it is important to reexamine the merit of these rationales in order to truly
evaluate how far arbitral immunity should extend. As will soon become evident,
several of the traditional rationales and justifications for extending absolute im-
munity to arbitrators no longer have merit. While some of these rationales are
more persuasive than others, none can justify the broad extension of absolute
immunity to arbitrators. Therefore, a more balanced and appropriate standard of
qualified immunity should be implemented.
The principal rationale underlying the extension of arbitral immunity is pre-
mised on the notion that arbitrators serve a role that is "functionally equivalent" to
the role of judges. 95 Because of this so-called functional equivalence, most Cir-
cuit Courts that considered the issue have held that private arbitration proceedings
and public adjudication proceedings deserve the same type of immunity.96 If arbi-
trators are functionally equivalent to judges, then it is necessary, the argument
goes, to extend immunity to arbitrators so that they too will be able to exercise
independent judgment.97 Proponents stress that independent judgment is vital to
the arbitration process because, by shielding arbitrators from the suits of dissatis-
fied parties, it ensures the credibility and finality of arbitration decisions.
98







95. See Austem v. Chi. Bd. Options Exch., Inc., 898 F.2d 882, 886 (2d Cir. 1990) (collecting federal
appellate decisions); Levine v. Wiss & Co., 478 A.2d 397, 407 (N.J. 1984).
96. See Austern, 898 F.2d at 886.
97. Weston, supra note 24, at 484.
98. Id. Proponents argue that subjecting arbitrators to litigation would reduce the number of persons
willing to serve as arbitrators, decrease the confidence parties have in the arbitration process, and
discourage the use of arbitration in general. See generally, Weston, supra note 24 (arguing that these
concerns are mostly unfounded).
No. 11
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But are these assertions true? Are the roles of arbitrators and judges as simi-
lar as these proponents maintain? A decision by the California Supreme Court is
telling. In Broughton v. Cigna Healthplans of California, the California Supreme
Court noted several significant differences between judges and arbitrators regard-
ing the roles and accountability of each. 99 For instance, the court stated that
judges are often locally elected and subject to public approval.' °° In contrast,
arbitrators are not elected to their positions.101 Rather, individuals may become
arbitrators by fulfilling certain qualifications.'0 2 Often these qualifications only
include completing a specified number of training and observation hours before
being able to arbitrate disputes. 10 3 Because arbitrators are not elected to their
positions, they do not need to be as concerned with the public's perception or
approval of the job that they do. Their retention does not depend on public sup-
port, and thus makes them less accountable to the public. Added to that is the fact
that most states have not established professional standards or licensing require-
ments for arbitrators that exist in other professions. °4 Taking these differences
into consideration, absolute immunity fails to adequately protect an individual's
rights.
Arbitrators also face less accountability than judges in terms of oversight and
evaluation. While it could be argued that parties inject accountability into the
system by choosing arbitrators based on their reputation, that alone is not always
enough to protect the party's interest. Moreover, even though arbitrators are regu-
lated under the FAA and various state statutes, this does not mean that their per-
formance is evaluated in the same manner as a judge's performance. Judges are
subject to discipline by their state's Commission on Judicial Performance, but
similar review boards are not in place for arbitration proceedings. 0 5 The imple-
mentation of review boards in states would probably go a long way to alleviate
concerns over an arbitrator's abuse of discretion in arbitration proceedings, under
either a qualified or absolute immunity system.
An additional difference between judges and arbitrators is the standard of re-
view applicable to their decisions. While judges' decisions are subject to appel-
late review, the FAA allows parties to appeal arbitration decisions only in limited
circumstances. 0 6 Furthermore, the ways in which a party may file a motion to
99. Broughton v. Cigna Healthplans of Cal., 988 P.2d 67, 77-78 (Cal. 1999).




104. Marcus Nieto & Margaret Hosel, Arbitration in California Managed Health Care Systems, (Dec.
2000), available at http://www.library.ca.gov/crb/00/09/0O-009.pdf (last visited Apr. 15, 2009).
105. Id.
106. 9 U.S.C. § 16 (2000). An appeal may be taken from:
1. an order
(a)refusing a stay of any action under section 3 of this title,
(b) denying a petition under section 4 of this title to order arbitration to proceed,
(c) denying an application under section 206 of this title to compel arbitration,
(d) confirming or denying confirmation of an award or partial award, or
(e)modifying, correcting, or vacating an award;
2. an interlocutory order granting, continuing, or modifying an injunction against an arbitration
that is subject to this title; or
3. a final decision with respect to an arbitration that is subject to this title.
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vacate the decision are similarly restrictive under the FAA. 10 7 Thus, the circums-
tances under which state or federal courts can grant vacatur motions are very li-
mited.1 °8 The FAA also imposes a strict time frame to file a motion to vacate:
individuals must file the motion within three months of the date the arbitrator filed
or delivered the decision.1° 9 By limiting a party's avenue for appeal or vacatur
and by implementing strict regulations regarding the time frame in which motions
must be filed, courts have left dissatisfied arbitration participants with few options
to combat an unfair arbitration proceeding or incompetent arbitrator.
One final difference is the nature of each proceeding. While judicial proceed-
ings are largely public in nature, arbitration proceedings are characterized by pri-
vacy and are closed to the public. °10 This privacy is especially troubling when
combined with the fact that arbitration decisions are subjected to minimal appel-
late review. These two characteristics make it highly unlikely that arbitrators'
decisions will be questioned.
The lack of accountability in the arbitration system is a concern because it can
have dire consequences for both the profession and the individuals involved. For
one thing, when arbitrators have no fear of being reprimanded, they may become
careless and more likely to render poor decisions. 11  Additionally, in a system
where only limited review of decisions is available, the finality of judgments can
trump individuals' rights to a just outcome.112 Arbitrators are also held less ac-
countable to the public and the profession than judges. Considering these differ-
ences, it is clear that arbitrators and judicial officers play different roles and
should not receive the same type of immunity. Arbitrators, rather than receiving
absolute judicial immunity, should only receive qualified immunity. Otherwise,
arbitrators are allowed to have all the perks judges enjoy with less responsibility.
Another critique of extending absolute immunity to arbitrators is that tradi-
tional assumptions underlying arbitral immunity are outdated and overbroad. It
has long been argued that absolute immunity is necessary to recruit volunteers to
serve as arbitrators." 3 In fact, courts have been especially apt to use this justifica-
tion in extending immunity to quasi-judicial actors (e.g. executive officials, and
officials with prosecutorial duties that are "intimately associated with the judicial
phase of the criminal process)."'"4  While this policy consideration might have
107. 9 U.S.C. § 10.
108. See id. Under the FAA, grounds for vacature are available in the following circumstances:
(1) where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means;
(2) where there was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators, or either of them;
(3) where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone the hearing, upon suf-
ficient cause shown, or in refusing to hear evidence pertinent and material to the controversy; or
of any other misbehavior by which the rights of any party have been prejudiced; or
(4) where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed them that a mutual,
final, and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not made.
Id.
109. 9 U.S.C. § 12 (Notice of a motion to vacate, modify, or correct an award must be served upon
the adverse party or his attorney within three months after the award is filed or delivered). Id.
110. Broughton v. Cigna Healthplans of Cal., 988 P.2d 67, 77-78 (Cal. 1999).
111. ALAN REDFERN ET AL., LAW AND PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION at
242 (Sweet & Maxwell 2004).
112. Id.
113. Weston, supra note 24, at 500.
114. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430 (1976).
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been relevant in the past, it is not true today with the proliferation of private arbi-
tration practices." 5 In fact, with the onset of private practices, there has been a
renewed wave of criticism calling for arbitrators to be held accountable for their
actions in arbitration proceedings." 16
These critics assert that liability should be extended to private arbitration
practices in certain circumstances because it is unfair to allow arbitrators to reap
the economic benefits of their practice while avoiding responsibility for their deci-
sions." 7 Some even argue that, like other professionals, arbitrators should be
required to carry liability insurance." 8 This interesting proposition has merit. If
doctors and lawyers are subject to suit by dissatisfied patients and clients, why
should arbitrators be any different? Arbitrators have the authority to make final
binding decisions that can be just as life altering as any decision a lawyer might
make on behalf of his client. With authority comes responsibility, and arbitrators
need to be responsible for their actions and decisions during an arbitration.
For people who worry about the effect of liability insurance policies, propo-
nents of such policies respond that it is unlikely that the "industry will go away" if
arbitrators are held responsible for their actions like other professionals."19 Of
course, one potential downfall of requiring arbitrators to carry liability insurance
is that such a policy may increase the costs of arbitration because the expense
would likely be passed onto the parties in one way or another. Even so, it is likely
that arbitration participants would accept slightly increased costs to ensure a fair
hearing with a competent arbitrator.
In essence, the current policy of granting absolute immunity to arbitrators is
not fair to arbitration participants and should be reexamined. It is irrational for
states and organizations to continue to support policies such as arbitral immunity
if those policies are not equally concerned with maintaining the integrity of the
process. With more and more businesses requiring mandatory commercial arbi-
tration, it is crucial that arbitration is a fair and legitimate process. If individuals
have no faith in the integrity of the process, they will likely choose not to pursue
arbitration as an alternative means of dispute resolution. Similarly, and perhaps of
even greater importance, is the fact that people will not want to use a system that
might truly be fair if it appears to be unfair. In other words, sometimes the ap-
pearance of integrity is just as crucial as the actual integrity of the process. Arbi-
tration has thrived in recent years, but the success may not continue if arbitrators
are given absolute, free reign.
In order to improve the quality of and confidence in arbitration proceedings,
courts should strike a balance that addresses the courts' dual concerns: protecting
the public from possible arbitrator abuse and providing arbitrators with immunity
to ensure independent decision making. This desirable (and much needed) bal-
ance may be achieved with qualified, rather than absolute, immunity. Qualified
immunity would hold arbitrators accountable when arbitrators make decisional
acts that are within their jurisdiction. 20 It would also hold arbitrators liable for





120. Weston, supra note 24, at 516.
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their actions done in bad faith, such as instances of fraud or gross negligence. It is
only common sense that if a person acts in bad faith, he or she should be held
liable for his or her actions. In this way, arbitrators would be viewed more as
professionals who may incur liability in limited circumstances. In addition to
limiting the arbitrator's immunity, qualified immunity would also limit the im-
munity of providers in that it would not extend immunity to arbitral providers who
are "alleged to have violated their own internal rules, failed to fulfill their contrac-
tual obligations with the parties, or improperly performed duties with respect to
the administration and oversight of the arbitral process...,,12I Taking all of this
into consideration, qualified immunity provides immunity where necessary to
protect arbitrators from trivial lawsuits and to protect the independent decision
making of the arbitrators, but not in a way that is so overbroad as to compromise
the integrity of the arbitration process.
12 2
Malik presented the court with the perfect occasion to reexamine the issue of
arbitral immunity in interpreting the model statue's immunity provision. Here, the
court correctly concluded the arbitrator was acting within his adjudicative or deci-
sion-making authority when he decided not to remove the attorney from the pro-
ceedings, but the court fell short in its reasoning. While the court hinted that after
Malik arbitral immunity would later only apply to "judicial acts," it still failed to
sufficiently narrow the doctrine.123 In its analysis, the court did note that the New
Jersey statute equated arbitrator immunity with judicial immunity and thus abso-
lute immunity applied.124 That said, even if the court stuck to the plain language
meaning of the statute, the court could have more thoroughly scrutinized the doc-
trine of absolute immunity. Rather than merely going along with past decisions
extending absolute judicial immunity to arbitral immunity, the court could have
(and should have) cautioned of the dangers of such broad immunity and urged the
legislature to amend the statute to reflect these concerns. Unfortunately, the court
did not do this because it did not even consider the concept of qualified immunity.
Thus, this decision is disappointing not because of the outcome, but because the
court missed a crucial opportunity to take a stand regarding arbitral immunity.
The sort of blind acceptance of absolute arbitral immunity evidenced by this court
and other courts is problematic because the justification for absolute immunity is
no longer applicable in light of modem arbitration practices. This is an important
question and courts, for whatever reason, seem unwilling to even entertain a dis-
cussion that does not repeat the status quo.
So what are the likely effects of this decision? By failing to critically analyze
the doctrine of arbitral immunity, the court made it that much more difficult to
make changes in arbitral immunity policies in the future. This is troubling for the
arbitration community. Without accountability within the system, the very inte-
grity and viability of arbitration proceedings is threatened. Individuals are likely
to lose faith and confidence in a system that is largely private and unaccountable
to the public. A better and more thoughtful approach would have discussed the
adoption of qualified immunity. Qualified immunity is the only type of immunity
that will strike an appropriate balance that "protects arbitral decision making
121. Id. at 509-10.
122. Id.
123. Malik v. Ruttenberg, 942 A.2d 136, 139-42 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2008).
124. Id. at 139.
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while not shielding non-decisional acts, administrative acts, failure to follow in-
ternal administrative or procedural rules, or egregious misconduct, breach of eth-
ics, fraud, or statutory violations."' 5 The Malik court could have gone a long way
in solidifying the continued use of arbitration by arguing for qualified arbitral
immunity, but declined to do so. Regrettably, when other states adopt their own
codes based on the Model Act, it is likely that those state courts will look to Malik
to interpret the immunity provision in a similarly broad fashion.
VI. CONCLUSION
While absolute judicial immunity helps to guarantee independence in the
judicial system, that same privilege should not extend to quasi-judicial figures like
arbitrators. Arbitrators and judges do not share identical roles or have identical
qualifications, so it makes sense to extend different types of immunity to each.
Beyond these substantial differences in roles, the lack of arbitrator accountability
is probably the most troubling aspect of granting arbitrators absolute immunity.
Unlike in the judicial system, there are few safeguards in place if an arbitrator
does abuse his discretion. Ensuring judicial independence is vital to maintaining
the integrity of the system, but arbitrator accountability should not be sacrificed in
the process. In Malik, the court had a chance to forge a new direction and move
away from the status quo of absolute immunity. The court declined to do so, thus
it will likely be more difficult to implement substantive change in the future. The
Malik decision is disappointing because it is evident that change is necessary. By
adopting the more limited approach of qualified immunity, the courts and legisla-
tures would be able to strike a balance that better satisfies the goals of integrity
and accountability. In doing so, they would finally implement a policy that is
truly best for participants, arbitrators, and the ADR community alike.
JENNY BROWN
125. Weston, supra note 24, at 517.
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